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Abstract
In 2009, Shepherd and Bremner proposed a “test of
quantum capability” [1] that is attractive because the
quantum machine’s output can be verified efficiently
by classical means. While follow-up papers [2, 3] gave
evidence that directly simulating the quantum prover
is classically hard, the security of the protocol against
other (non-simulating) classical attacks has remained
an open question. In this paper, I demonstrate that
the protocol is not secure against classical provers. I
describe a classical algorithm that can not only con-
vince the verifier that the (classical) prover is quan-
tum, but can in fact can extract the secret key under-
lying a given protocol instance. Furthermore, I show
that the algorithm is efficient in practice for prob-
lem sizes of hundreds of qubits. Finally, I provide an
implementation of the algorithm, and give the secret
vector underlying the “$25 challenge” posted online
by the authors of the original paper.
1 Introduction
Tests of quantum speedup (or “quantum supremacy”
tests) have generated excitement recently as several
experiments reach the cusp of demonstrating quan-
tum computational power in the laboratory. In the
past decade, numerous protocols have been designed
for the purpose of demonstrating a quantum speedup
in solving some (possibly contrived) mathematical
problem. A difficulty of many of them, however, is
that the quantum machine’s output is difficult to ver-
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ify. In many cases, the best known algorithm for
checking the solution is equivalent to solving the full
problem classically. This presents a serious issue for
validation of the quantum results, because by defini-
tion the supremacy regime is that where a classical
solution is hard.1
In 2009, Shepherd and Bremner introduced an
efficiently-verifiable protocol [1] that places only mea-
ger requirements on the quantum device, making it a
good candidate for near-term hardware. It requires
only sampling from a quantum circuit in which the
gates all commute (a class introduced by those au-
thors as IQP). Furthermore, the authors demonstrate
in follow-up papers [2, 3] that classically sampling
from the distribution should be hard, suggesting a
“black-box” approach to cheating classically (by sim-
ply simulating the quantum device) is indeed compu-
tationally difficult, and only a couple hundred qubits
would be required to make a classical solution in-
tractable.
Importantly, however, the classical verifier in [1]
doesn’t actually check whether the prover’s samples
come from the correct distribution (in fact, [3] sug-
gests doing such a check efficiently is not possible).
Instead, the sampling task is designed such that bit-
strings from its distribution will be orthogonal to
some secret vector s with high probability, and it
is this property that is checked. A question that has
remained open is whether a classical machine could
generating samples satisfying the orthogonality check
without actually simulating the distribution. In this
paper I show that the answer is yes. I give an ex-
1In fact, in e.g. the Google team’s recent paper [4], check-
ing the solution is harder than simply solving the problem
classically.
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Figure 1: Mean time to extract the secret vector
s from X-programs constructed as described in [1].
Shaded region is the first to third quartile of the dis-
tribution of runtimes. We observe that the time is
polynomial and fast in practice even up to problem
sizes of hundreds of qubits. See Section 3.2 for a dis-
cussion of the O (n2) scaling. The data points were
computed by applying the algorithm to 1000 unique
X-programs at each problem size. The secret vec-
tor was successfully extracted for every X-program
tested. Experiments were completed using one thread
on an Intel 8268 "Cascade Lake" processor.
plicit algorithm that can extract the secret vector s
underlying an instance of the protocol, thus making
it trivial to generate orthogonal samples that pass
the verifier’s test. The main results of this paper are
a statement of the algorithm, a proof that a single
iteration of it will extract the secret vector s with
probability 1/2 (Theorem 3.1)2, and empirical results
demonstrating that it is efficient in practice (summa-
rized in Figure 1).
The following is a summary of the paper’s struc-
ture. In Section 2, I review some points from the
original paper [1] that are especially relevant to the
analysis here. In Section 3 I describe the algorithm
to extract the secret key, and therefore break the pro-
tocol’s security against classical provers. There I also
discuss briefly my implementation of the algorithm.
In Section 4 I discuss related protocols, and provide
the secret key underlying the “$25 challenge” posted
to the web by the authors of the original paper.
2 Background
Overview of protocol At the core of the protocol
in [1] is a sampling problem. The classical verifier
generates a Hamiltonian HP consisting of a sum of
products of Pauli X operators, and asks the quantum
prover to sample the probability distribution arising
from the state eiHPpi/8 |0⊗n〉. The Hamiltonian is not
exactly random, but instead is designed such that the
samples {xi} are biased such that xi·s = 03 with high
probability for some secret vector s. The classical
verifier, with knowledge of s, can quickly check that
the samples have such a bias. Since s should be only
known to the verifier, it is conjectured in [1] that
the only efficient way to generate such samples is by
actually doing the evolution. In Section 3 I show
that it is possible to extract s classically from just
the description of the Hamiltonian.
X-programs A Hamiltonian of the type used in
this protocol can be described by a rectangular ma-
2This probability can be made arbitrarily close to 1 by rep-
etition.
3This inner product is over F2; all arithmetic in this paper
is modulo 2 unless otherwise noted.
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trix of binary numbers, for which each row corre-
sponds to a Hamiltonian term. Given such a matrix
P (called an “X-program”), the Hamiltonian is
HP =
∑
i
∏
j
XPij (2.1)
In words, a 1 in P at row i and column j corre-
sponds to the inclusion of a Pauli X operator on the
jth site in the ith term of the Hamiltonian. The X-
program also has one additional parameter θ, which
is the “action”—the integrated energy over time for
which the Hamiltonian will be applied.
I note here that the original paper discusses ma-
troids rather than matrices. The perspective of this
paper is that we have been given an explicit matrix P
acting as a canonical representative for the relevant
matroid; it will be sufficient here to simply discuss P
as a matrix, and I will do so for the rest of the paper.
Embedding a bias and verifying the output In
order to bias the output distribution along s, a sub-
matrix with special properties is embedded within
the matrix P . For a vector x and matrix P , we
can define the submatrix Px as that which is gen-
erated by deleting all rows of P that are orthogonal
to x. Under this notation, our relevant submatrix is
Ps where s is the secret vector. For the output distri-
bution to be appropriately biased, [1] suggests that
Ps should correspond to the generator matrix of an
error-correcting code—in particular, the authors sug-
gest using a quadratic residue code and setting the
action θ = pi/8. As described below, this choice leads
to a gap between the quantum and classical proba-
bilities of generating samples orthogonal to s (for the
best known classical strategy in [1]). The verifier’s
check is simply to request a large number of samples,
and then determine if the fraction orthogonal to s is
too large to have likely been generated by the classi-
cal distribution.
In the two Facts below, I recall the probabilities
from [1] corresponding to that paper’s quantum and
classical strategies. The reasoning behind the clas-
sical strategy (Fact 2.2) is crucial to the rest of this
paper; it is worth understanding its proof before mov-
ing on to the algorithm in Section 3.
Fact 2.1. Quantum strategy
Let P be an X-program which has an embedded sub-
matrix Ps for some secret vector s, such that Ps is
the generator matrix for a quadratic residue code up
to permutation of rows. Let X be a random variable
representing the distribution of bitstrings from an n-
qubit quantum state eiHPpi/8 |0〉 measured in the Z
basis, where HP is defined as in Equation 2.1. Then,
Pr [X · s = 0] = cos2
(pi
8
)
≈ 0.85 · · · (2.2)
Proof. The proof is contained in [1].
Fact 2.2. Classical strategy of [1]
Let d, e be two bitstrings of length n (the length
of a row of P ). Define Pd,e as the matrix generated
by deleting the rows of P orthogonal to d or e.4 Let
y =
∑
pi∈Pd,e pi be the vector sum of the rows of
Pd,e. Letting Y be the random variable representing
the distribution of y when d and e are chosen uni-
formly at random, then
Pr [Y · s = 0] = 3/4 (2.3)
Proof. With y defined as above, we have
y · s =
∑
pi∈Pd,e
pi · s (2.4)
By defintion, pi ·s = 1 if pi ∈ Ps. Therefore y ·s is
equivalent to simply counting the number of rows in
both Ps and Pd,e, or equivalently, counting the rows
in Ps for which p · d and p · e are both 1. We can
express this using the matrix-vector products of Ps
with d and e:
y · s =
∑
pi∈Ps
(p · d) (p · e) (2.5)
= (Ps d) · (Ps e) (2.6)
Considering that Ps is the generator matrix for an
error correcting code, I denote cd = Ps d as the en-
coding of d under Ps. In this notation, we have
y · s = cd · ce (2.7)
4In [1], Pd,e is written as Pd ∩ Pe.
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Now, we note that the quadratic residue code (for
which Ps is a generator matrix) has the property that
any two codewords cd and ce have cd · ce = 0 iff
either cd or ce has even parity.5 Half of the quadratic
residue code’s words have even parity and cd and ce
are random codewords, so the probability that either
of them has even parity is 3/4. Thus, the probability
that y · s = 0 is 3/4, proving the fact.
In the next section, we show that the classical strat-
egy just described can be improved.
3 Algorithm
The classical strategy described in [1] and reproduced
in Fact 2.2 above generates vectors that are orthog-
onal to s with probability 3/4. The key to this paper
is that it is possible to correlate the vectors gener-
ated by that strategy, such that with probability 1/2
one may generate a large set of vectors that all are
orthogonal to s. When that happens, they form a
system of linear equations that can be solved to yield
s. Finally, with knowledge of s it is trivial to generate
samples that pass the verifier’s test.
To generate such a correlated set, we follow a mod-
ified version of the original classical strategy. Instead
of choosing random bitstrings for both d and e, we
hold d constant, only choosing new values for e for
each vector. Crucially, if the encoding cd of d un-
der Ps has even parity, all of the generated vectors
mi will have mi · s = 0. (See Theorem 3.1). This
will happen with probability 1/2 over our choice of d
(whenever cd = Ps d has even parity).
In practice, it is more convenient to do the linear
solve if all mi · s = 1 instead of 0. This can be
accomplished by adding a vector m∗ with m∗ ·s = 1
to each mi. It turns out that m∗ =
∑
p∈rows(P ) p
has this property; see proof of Theorem 3.1.
The explicit algorithm for extracting the vector s
is given in Algorithm 1.
5This can be seen from the fact that the extended quadratic
residue code, created by adding a single parity bit, is self-dual
(and all extended codewords have even parity). [1]
Algorithm 1 ExtractKey(P )
The algorithm to extract the secret vector s from an
X-program P . n is the number of columns in the
X-program, and $← means “select uniformly from the
set.”
1. Let m∗ =
∑
p∈rows(P ) p.
2. Pick d $← {0, 1}n.
3. Generate a large number (say 2n) of vectors mi,
forming the rows of a matrix M . For each:
(a) Pick e $← {0, 1}n
(b) Let mi = m∗ +
∑
p∈rows(P )
p·d=p·e=1
p
4. Via linear solve, find the set of vectors {si} sat-
isfying Msi = 1, where 1 is the vector of all
ones.
5. For each candidate vector si:
(a) Extract Psi from P by deleting the rows of
P orthogonal to si
(b) If Psi has the properties of a quadratic
residue code up to row reordering (i.e.
codewords have wt (c) ∈ {−1, 0} (mod4)),
return s and exit.
6. No candidate vector s was found; return ⊥.
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3.1 Analysis
Theorem 3.1. On input an X-program P contain-
ing a unique embedded submatrix Ps that is a gen-
erator matrix for the quadratic residue code (up to
rearrangement of its rows), Algorithm 1 will output
the corresponding vector s with probability 12 .
Proof. If s is contained in the set {si} generated in
step 3 of the algorithm, the correct vector s will be
output via the check in step 4 because there is a
unique submatrix Ps corresponding to the quadratic
residue code. s will be contained in {si} as long as
M satisfies the equation Ms = 1. Thus we desire to
show that Ms = 1 with probability 1/2.
Each row of M is
mi = m
∗ + m¯i (3.1)
for a vector m¯i defined as
m¯i =
∑
p∈rows(P )
p·d=p·e=1
p (3.2)
Here I will show thatm∗ ·s = 1 always and m¯i ·s = 0
for all i with probability 1/2, implying that Ms = 1
with probability 1/2.
First I show that m∗ · s = 1. m∗ is the sum of all
rows of P , so we have
m∗ · s =
∑
p∈rows(P )
p · s =
∑
p∈rows(Ps)
1 (3.3)
We see that the inner product is equal to the number
of rows in the submatrix Ps. This submatrix is a gen-
erator matrix for the quadratic residue code, which
has a number of rows equal to a prime q > 2; the
number of rows is odd and thus
m∗ · s = 1 (3.4)
Now I turn to showing that m¯i · s = 0 for all i
with probability 1/2. In the proof of Fact 2.2, it was
shown that for any two vectors d and e, vectors m¯i
generated by summing rows pi of P for which d ·pi =
e · pi = 1 have
m¯i · s = 0 iff cd or ce has even parity (3.5)
where cd and ce are the encodings under Ps of d and
e respectively. If d is held constant for all i, and d
happened to be chosen such that cd = Ps d has even
parity, then m¯i · s = 0 for all i by Equation 3.5. Be-
cause half of the codewords of the quadratic residue
code have even parity, for d selected uniformly at
random we have m¯i · s = 0 for all i with probability
1/2.
I have shown that m∗ ·s = 1 always and m¯i ·s = 0
for all i with probability 1/2. Therefore we have
Pr
d
[mi · s = 1 ∀ i] = 1/2
Thus Ms = 1 with probability 1/2. The algorithm
will output s whenever Ms = 1, proving the theo-
rem.
Having established that the algorithm outputs s
with high probability (that can be made arbitrarily
close to 1 by repetition), we now turn to analyzing
its runtime.
Claim 3.1. (empirical) Algorithm 1 halts in O (n3)
time on average.
All steps of the algorithm except for step 4 have
O (n3) scaling by inspection. The obstacle prevent-
ing Claim 3.1 from trivially holding is that it is hard
to make a rigorous statement about how large the
set of candidate vectors {si} is. Because |{si}| =
2n−rank(M), we’d like to show that on average, the
rank of M is close to or equal to n. It seems reason-
able that this would be the case: we are generating
the rows ofM by summing rows from P , and P must
have full rank because it contains a rank-n error cor-
recting code. But the rows of P summed into each
mi are not selected independently—they are always
related via their connection to the vectors d and e,
and it’s not clear how these correlations affect the
linear independence of the resulting mi.
Despite the lack of a proof, empirical evidence sup-
ports Claim 3.1 when the algorithm is applied to X-
programs generated in the manner described in [1].
Figure 2(a) shows the average number of candidate
keys checked by the algorithm before s is found, as
a function of problem size. The value is constant,
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Figure 2: (a) The average number of candidate vec-
tors checked before the secret vector s was found,
when the algorithm was applied to 1000 unique X-
programs at each problem size tested. We observe
that the number of vectors to check is constant in
n. (b) The number of unconstrained degrees of free-
dom n− rank (M) for matrices M generated in step
3 of Algorithm 1, for “good” choices of d such that
Ms = 1. The rapidly decaying tail implies that it
is rare for any more than a few degrees of freedom
to remain unconstrained. The blue bars represent
the distribution over 1000 unique X-programs of size
n = 245. The algorithm was then re-run on the X-
programs that had n− rank (M) > 4 to generate the
orange bars.
demonstrating that the average size of the set {si}
does not scale with n. Furthermore, the value is
small—only about 4. This implies that M usually
has high rank. In Figure 2(b) I plot explicitly the
distribution of the rank of the matrix M over 1000
runs of the algorithm on unique X-programs of size
n = 245. The blue bars (on the left of each pair) show
the distribution over all X-programs tested, and the
sharply decaying tail supports the claim that low-
rank M almost never occur.
A natural next question is whether there is some
feature of the X-programs in that tail that causes
M to be low rank. To investigate that question, the
algorithm was re-run 100 times on each of the X-
programs that had n−rank (M) > 4 in the blue distri-
bution. The orange bars of Figure 2(b) (on the right
of each pair) plot the distribution of n− rank (M) for
that second run. The similarity of the blue and or-
ange distributions demonstrates that the rank of M
is not correlated between runs; that is, the low rank
of M in the first run was not due to any feature of
the input X-programs. From a practical perspective,
this data suggests that if the rank of M is found to
be unacceptably low, the algorithm can simply be re-
run with new randomness and the rank ofM is likely
to be higher the second time.
3.2 Implementation
An implementation of Algorithm 1 in the pro-
gramming language Julia is available online at
github.com/GregDMeyer/IQPwn. In that repository
is also code for generating the figures in this paper.
Figure 1 shows the runtime of this implementation for
various problem sizes. Experiments were completed
using one thread on an Intel 8268 "Cascade Lake"
processor.
Note that Figure 1 shows O (n2) scaling, rather
than O (n3) from Claim 3.1. This is due to data-
level parallelism in the implementation. Zn2 vectors
are stored as the bits of 64-bit integers, so operations
like vector addition can be performed on 64 elements
at once via bitwise operations. Furthermore, with
AVX SIMD CPU instructions, those operations can
be applied to multiple 64-bit integers in one CPU
cycle. Thus, for n of order 100, the ostensibly O (n)
6
vector inner products and vector sums are performed
in constant time, removing one factor of n from the
runtime. The tests in Figure 1 were performed on a
CPU with 512 bit vector units.
4 Discussion
Modifications to the protocol A natural ques-
tion is whether it is possible to modify the original
protocol such that this attack is not successful. Per-
haps P can be engineered such that either 1) it is not
possible to generate a large number of vectors that all
have a known inner product with s, or 2) the rank
of the matrix M formed by these generated vectors
will never be sufficiently high to allow solution of the
linear system.
For 1), our ability to generate many vectors or-
thogonal to s relies on the fact that the extended
quadratic residue code is even and self-dual. These
characteristics imply that if Ps d has even parity,
all of our subsequently generated vectors will have
mi · s = 0. Building P via a code without the self-
dual property would remove this possibility, though
the challenge is to do so while still maintaining the
bias in the quantum case, and without opening up
a new avenue to discovering s. I leave that pursuit
open.
For 2), the main obstacle is that the matrix P must
have rank n because embedded in it is a code of rank
n. The only hope is to somehow engineer the matrix
such that linear combinations generated in the spe-
cific way described above will not be linearly inde-
pendent. It’s not at all clear how one would do that,
and furthermore, adding structure to the previously-
random extra rows of P runs the risk of providing
even more information about the secret vector s. Per-
haps one could prove that the rank ofM will be large
even for worst-case inputs P—this would also be an
interesting future direction.
Protocols with provable hardness The attack
described in this paper reiterates the value of build-
ing protocols for which passing the check itself, rather
than just simulating the quantum device, can be
shown to be hard under well-established complexity-
theoretic assumptions. For example, the protocol
given in [5] is secure under the hardness assumption
of Learning With Errors. Unfortunately, such rig-
orous results come with a downside, which is an in-
crease in the size and complexity of circuits that must
be run on the quantum device. Exploring simplified
protocols that are provably secure is an interesting
area for further research.
Complexity theoretic implications Conjecture
3.2 of [1] supposes whether the language of matroids
with a hidden sub-matroid is NP-complete. In rough
terms, it asks if a BPP machine can efficiently decide
whether a given matrix P contains a hidden subma-
trix Ps corresponding to a generator matrix for the
quadratic residue code (up to permutations of rows).
The results in this paper cannot make a strong state-
ment about this conjecture; I have only empirically
established that Algorithm 1 halts in polynomial time
in the average case. It’s possible that there exist some
class of worst-case instances of P for which the algo-
rithm is not efficient; this would be an interesting
area for further research.
The $25 challenge At quantumchal-
lenges.wordpress.com, the authors of [1] posed
a challenge. They posted a specific instance of the
matrix P , and offered $25 to anyone who could send
them samples passing the verifier’s check. The secret
vector s corresponding to their challenge matrix P
is (encoded as a base-64 string):
BilbHzjYxrOHYH4OlEJFBoXZbps4a54kH8flrRgo/g==
The code used to extract the secret vector, as
well as a set of samples that should pass the
check for their challenge matrix, can be found at
github.com/GregDMeyer/IQPwn. If you’d like to
convert the above key into a binary string, you can
use the b64tobin script in the examples/ directory
of that repository.
Summary and outlook In this paper, I have de-
scribed a classical algorithm that passes the inter-
active quantum test described in [1]. I have proven
that a single iteration of the algorithm will return
7
the underlying secret vector with probability 1/2, and
empirically established that it is efficient. The im-
mediate implication of this result is that the proto-
col from [1] in its original form is no longer effective
as a test of quantumness. While it may be possi-
ble to reengineer that protocol to thwart this attack,
this paper reiterates the value of proving the secu-
rity of the verification step. Protocols with provable
security are valuable on their own, but can also be
used as building blocks for new, more complex re-
sults (see, for example, classically verifiable quantum
computation in [6] building off the protocol of [5]). As
quantum hardware begins to surpass the abilities of
classical machines, quantum cryptographic tools will
play an important role in making quantum computa-
tion available as a service. Establishing the security
of these protocols is an important first step.
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